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ABSTRACT
One of the main concerns about interlocking directorates is their effect on corporate 
performance; however, there is little research undertaken on this issue. Therefore, the 
objective of this study is to examine the effect of interlocking directorates on corporate 
performance by considering the nature and the direction of interlocking. The analyses are 
based on the data of 741 listed companies on Bursa Malaysia in 2007. The Ordinary Least 
Square regression results show that the number of interlocking companies, inter-industry 
interlocking directorates and interlocking created by independent directors are all significant 
and positively related to corporate performance, which is consistent with the resource 
dependence theory and the corporate governance theory. However, it is also discovered 
that both multiple directorships by executive directors and non-executive non-independent 
directors do not have any effect on corporate performance, which is consistent with the 
class integration theory. Despite the negative perception on interlocking directorates by 
the public, the findings suggest that interlocking directorates actually benefit shareholders 
by enhancing the earnings performance of the corporation.
Keywords: Corporate performance, directors, interlocking directorates
INTRODUCTION
The issue of directorships has long been 
discussed in corporate governance research 
and by policy makers due to the importance 
of the role of directors in the corporate 
structure. Among the debated issues is the 
matter of interlocking directorates, where 
directors of one company hold additional 
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directorships in other companies. The 
holding of multiple directorships has been 
criticised as it is said to limit the directors’ 
time and commitment in discharging their 
responsibilities (Ibrahim Raman & Saidin, 
2009).
In Malaysia, a study by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) found negative perceptions 
related to multiple directorships by the 
capital market; the study argued that this was 
due to the perception of ‘crony capitalism’, 
‘class consolidation’ and ‘elite capitalist 
integration’ in the Malaysian business 
environment. However, Hashim and Abdul 
Rahman (2011) found that the presence of 
interlocking directors enhances the quality 
of financial reporting due to the diligent 
monitoring and protection guaranteed by 
the reputation of these directors.
The government’s concern about this 
issue can be seen through the restriction 
on multiple directorships imposed Bursa 
Malaysia. Under Paragraph 15.06 of the 
Listing Requirements, a director of a listed 
company is restricted from holding not more 
than 25 directorships (10 in listed companies 
and 15 in unlisted companies). 
One of the main concerns about 
interlocking directorates is its effect on 
corporate performance. However, findings 
from earlier studies by Ferris, Jaghannathan 
and Pritchard (2003), Haniffa and Hudaib 
(2006), Liu and Yang (2008), Phan Lee and 
Lau (2003) and Shao (2010) have all shown 
mixed results of the effect of interlocking 
directorates on corporate performance. 
The mixed results may possibly be due to 
their failure to recognise the nature and the 
direction of the interlocking directorates. 
Therefore, the objective of this study is 
to examine the effects of interlocking 
directorates on corporate performance by 
considering the nature of directors and the 
direction of the interlocking directorates. 
LITERATURE REVIEW
The basic form of interlocking directorates 
occurs when a director of one corporation 
also sits on the board of directors of another 
corporation (Mizruchi, 1996). It also occurs 
when two directors from different companies 
(e.g. A and B) sit on the board of a third 
company (namely C), where company 
A and B are directly interlocked with 
company C (or the other way around) and 
indirectly interlocked with each other (Phan 
et al., 2003). Two main theories have been 
proposed by researchers for the existence 
of interlocking directorates. The class 
integration theory proposes that interlocking 
directorates occur as mutual protection of 
interest of a social class by its members 
(Koenig & Gogel, 1981). Under this theory, 
the directors are appointed from candidates 
within the personal network of incumbent 
directors who have similar backgrounds, 
characteristics and political beliefs to protect 
the welfare of the individual within the class 
(Phan et al., 2003). The resource dependence 
theory as proposed by Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978) argues that interlocks occur for the 
inter-organisational coordination exchange 
of resources (capital, information and 
market access) to overcome environmental 
uncertainty.
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Past studies on interlocking directorates 
focus more on the nature and reasons 
behind interlocking directorates. Generally, 
interlocking directorates are found to be 
a common phenomenon and an increase 
in the trend of interlocking directorates is 
found around the world (see for example 
Dooley, 1969; Ferris et al., 2003; Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006). 
Several factors contributing to the 
occurrences of interlocking directorates 
among corporations have been identified by 
earlier studies. Dooley (1969) hypothesised 
that the proven ability and the influence of 
directors of large corporations towards others 
(such as industry, potential investors and 
government) and the importance of business 
connections with large corporations by small/
medium corporations, make the directors of 
large corporations attractive candidates 
for other boards. Dooley also posits that 
due to the importance of corporation-
financial institution relationships such as 
funding (for the corporation) and reliable 
customers (for the financial institutions), 
interlocking directorates have been related 
to financial institutions. Dooley postulates 
that financially-difficult-corporations need 
to have a close connection with financial 
institutions (so they can have more ready 
access to funds) and at the same time, the 
need of monitoring by financial institutions 
has led to the occurrence of interlocking 
directorates by financial institutions. In 
addition, the existence of trust operations 
by financial institutions has also been 
a leading factor for the occurrence of 
interlocking directorates by financial 
institutions (Dooley, 1969). Besides that, 
the appointment of individual directors to 
other boards is the market’s reward to the 
individuals due to the superior performance 
enjoyed by the corporation in which the 
director serves (Ferris et al., 2003). It has 
also been postulated that the predominance 
of non-executive directors on the board of 
directors will lead to more interlocks since 
these directors will favour the nomination of 
individuals in their elite class (Phan et al., 
2003). At the same time, executive directors 
are less likely to hold directorships in other 
corporations due to their commitment and as 
well as to time constraints (Dooley, 1969). 
HYPOTHESES
Several arguments based on corporate 
governance and organisational theories have 
been used by earlier studies in hypothesising 
the effects of interlocking directorates 
on corporate performance. The class 
integration theory proposes that interlocking 
directorates occur as a form of mutual 
protection of interest within a social class 
by its members and therefore, it has been 
argued that interlocking directorates do not 
have any effect on corporate performance 
(Koenig & Gogel, 1981; Phan et al., 
2003). The corporate governance theory, 
however, offers that holding multiple 
directorships may have a negative effect 
on corporate performance due to limitation 
of time and increase in commitment by the 
interlocking directors (Ibrahim et al., 2009). 
Time and commitment limitation may 
affect interlocking directors’ monitoring 
ability. On the other hand, holding multiple 
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directorships may increase directors’ 
ability as monitors due to experience and 
knowledge gained by serving on multiple 
companies’ boards and increase their 
motivation to discharge their monitoring 
roles due to the concerns of damage to 
reputation (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The 
resource dependence theory as proposed 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), argues 
that interlocking directorates occur for 
inter-organisational coordination exchange 
of resources (capital, information and 
market access) to overcome environmental 
uncertainty, and, thus, may imply that 
interlocking directorates may have a positive 
effect on corporate performance.
Prior empirical evidence has shown 
mixed findings on the effects of multiple 
directorships on corporate performance. 
While Liu and Yang (2008) found significant 
negative relationships between multiple 
directorships and earnings, Shao (2010) 
provided evidence of significant positive 
relationships. The mixed findings by the 
above studies may probably be due to the 
failure to recognise the types of director 
involved in interlocking directorates. 
Limitation of t ime and increase in 
commitment due to holding multiple 
directorships as argued by Ibrahim et 
al. (2009) may be true for executive 
directors, due to their daily involvement 
in business operations, while the argument 
that experience and knowledge are gained 
as proposed by Fama and Jensen (1983) 
may be suitable for non-executive directors, 
due to their indirect involvement in daily 
business operations. In the Malaysian 
business environment, it can be seen 
that interlocking directorates are more 
pronounced among non-executive directors 
than executive directors. Therefore, the 
following hypotheses are developed:
H1: Average multiple directorships have 
a significant positive relationship 
with corporate performance.
H1a: Average executive directors’ 
mul t ip le  d i rec torships  have 
a negative effect on corporate 
performance.
H1b: Average non-executive non-
independent directors’ multiple 
directorships have a positive effect 
on corporate performance.
H1c: Average independent directors’ 
multiple directorships have a 
posi t ive effect  on corporate 
performance.
The above studies view interlocking 
directorates at the individual (directors) 
level without considering the organisational 
(company) level. Interlocking directorates 
may exist between companies in the 
same industry (known as intra-industry 
interlocking directorates) or in different 
industry (also known as inter-industry 
interlocking directorates) (Phan et al., 
2003). Phan et al. (2003) argued that 
intra-industry interlocking directorates are 
important for the coordination exchange of 
resources and inter-industry interlocking 
directorates are important for a wide view of 
business environment. Based on Singapore 
listed companies, Phan et al. (2003) found 
that inter-industry interlocking directorates 
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have a significant positive relationship 
with return on equity (ROE) but failed to 
find any significant effect contributed by 
intra-industry interlocking directorates. 
Therefore, the following hypotheses are 
developed:
H2: Total number of interlocking 
companies has a positive effect on  
corporate performance.
H2a:  Inter- industry inter locking 
directorates have a positive effect 
on corporate performance.
H2b:  Intra-industry interlocking 
directorates have a positive effect 
on corporate performance.
METHOD
The archival method is used to collect data 
from listed companies in Bursa Malaysia 
both on Main and Second Board (now 
known as Main Market) in 2007. Listed 
companies are chosen due to their publicly 
available annual reports, and 2007 data 
is used due to the stability of the country 
both economically and politically during 
that period of time. As at 31 December 
2007, 863 companies are listed on Bursa 
Malaysia, but only 741 companies are used 
in the final sample. Due to the difference in 
the regulatory requirements, all financial 
and unit trust companies are excluded. In 
addition to that, newly listed companies 
are also excluded because of unavailability 
of prior year annual reports and financial 
year-end change companies are also 
excluded due to inconsistency of their data. 
Furthermore, 42 companies are excluded 
due to incomplete data and another 12 
companies are also excluded due to the 
negative value of their equity.
For the multivariate analysis, the 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression 
will be used. The model takes the following 
form:
PERFORMANCE  
= b1INTERLOCKING + b2ISSUE 
+ b3BOARD+ b4FOREIGN  
+ b5DIROWN + b6BODIND  
+ b7BODSIZE + b8GROWTH  
+ b9LSUBS + b10LAGE  
+ b10LEVERAGE + C
The dependent variable represents 
corporate performance. Two common 
proxies for corporate performance are 
market return and accounting return, but 
only accounting return will be used in this 
study. The accounting return is suitable 
for long-term phenomenon, whilst market 
return measurement is more suitable for 
the testing of the effects of specific events 
(Phan et al., 2003). Two accounting return 
measurements are used, namely, return on 
equity (ROE) and return on asset (ROA). 
High values of ROE and ROA indicate 
effective use of company resources in 
enhancing the shareholders’ wealth. ROE 
is calculated as the ratio of the net income 
to the book value of equity and ROA is 
calculated as the ratio of the net income to 
the book value of assets.
Consistent with Phan et al. (2003), 
only interlocking directorates within 
the population and direct interlocking 
directorates will be counted. The inclusion 
of interlocking directorates outside the 
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population and indirect interlocking 
directorates will complicate the calculation. 
Two main measurements are used in defining 
interlocking directorates, namely, average 
additional directorships and the number 
of interlocking companies. Consistent 
with Feris et al. (2003), TOTALOCK 
is measured by the average number of 
additional directorships held by all directors, 
EXECLOCK is measured by the average 
number of additional directorships held by 
executive directors, NONLOCK is measured 
by the average number of additional 
directorships held by non-executive non-
independent directors and INDLOCK 
is measured by the average number of 
additional directorships held by independent 
directors. Meanwhile, consistent with Phan 
et al. (2003), INTERLOCK is measured by 
the number of other companies served in 
by the directors of the observed company, 
INTRA is measured by the number of other 
companies served in by the directors of the 
observed company within the same industry 
and INTER is measured by the number of 
other companies served in by the directors 
of the observed company in the different 
industry. 
Several factors have been said to affect 
corporate performance (see for example 
Fama & Jensen, 1983; Liu & Yang, 2008; 
Shao, 2010) and therefore, these variables 
are included in the model to control for 
the interrelation of these variables. ISSUE 
is measured by dummy, 1 if observed 
company issues additional shares or acquires 
additional loan in the current year and 0 if 
otherwise; BOARD is measured by dummy, 
1 if observed company is listed on Main 
Board and 0 if otherwise; and FOREIGN is 
measured by dummy, 1 if observed company 
has foreign subsidiaries and 0 if otherwise. 
DIROWN is measured by the proportion 
of shares, directly and indirectly owned 
by directors; GROWTH is measured by 
the changes in sales over prior year sales; 
LSUBS is measured by natural logarithm of 
the number of the company’s subsidiaries; 
and LAGE is measured by natural logarithm 
of the number of years a company is listed 
on Bursa Malaysia. All of these variables 
are expected to have significant positive 
relationships with corporate performance. 
Meanwhile, LEVERAGE is measured 
by the proportion of total liabilities over 
total assets and is expected to have a 
negative effect on corporate performance. 
BODSIZE is measured by the number of 
board of directors’ members and BODIND 
is measured by the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board of directors. 
RESULTS
Descriptive
Table 1 and Table 2 present the descriptive 
statistic of the continuous variables and the 
dummy variables respectively. 
Table 1 shows that on average, the 
return on asset (ROA) is 3.7 % and return 
on equity (ROE) is 4.5 %. On average, a 
company shares its director with 5 other 
listed companies, with the highest number 
of companies being 23. It also shows 
that a company is interlocked more with 
companies in a different industry (a mean 
of 4 companies are found for inter-industry 
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interlocking directorates, while a mean of 
1 company for intra-industry interlocking 
directorates). Based on directors, on 
average, a director holds almost 1 additional 
directorship in other companies, whereby 
independent directors hold 1 additional 
directorship and executive directors only 
hold 0.44 additional directorships. This 
implies that interlocking directorates is more 
pronounced among independent directors 
than any other types of director and is 
more likely to incur between companies in 
different industries.
Related to board of directors, the average 
size is 8 members with the minimum being 3 
and the maximum being 17 members. About 
64 % of the directors are non-executive 
directors. On average, the directors also own 
about 37 % of the shares of the companies. 
The average number of years a company 
has been listed on Bursa Malaysia is 13 and 
the average number of subsidiaries is 21 
companies. The average value of leverage 
is 40 % and sales increase is by 23 %. Table 
2 shows that 16 % of the sample companies 
(115 companies) have issued additional 
shares and acquire additional long-term 
liabilities, 73 % (539 companies) are listed 
on Main Board and 58 % (427 companies) 
have foreign subsidiary.
Univariate
Table 3 shows the univariate result by 
comparing the ROE and ROA between 
companies with interlocking directorates 
and companies without interlocking 
TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Continuous Variables
Variables Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev
TOTALOCK 0 4.25 0.757 0.712
EXECLOCK 0 7 0.446 0.887
NONLOCK 0 8 0.587 1.053
INDLOCK 0 7 1.045 1.066
INTERLOCK 0 23 4.668 4.235
INTRA 0 7 1.078 1.448
INTER 0 22 3.579 3.534
DIROWN 0 0.992 0.365 0.243
BODIND 0.286 1 0.637 0.174
BODSIZE 3 17 7.522 2.006
GROWTH -1 17.837 0.232 0.877
LSUBS 0 2.535 1.123 0.419
LAGE 0 1.663 0.988 0.366
LEVERAGE 0.001 0.985 0.398 0.210
ROA -1.406 1.426 0.037 0.121
ROE -7.751 2.271 0.045 0.381
AGE 1 46 13.472 11.030
SUBS 0 342 20.734 31.214
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Dummy Variables
Variables Variables Number Percentage
ISSUE Issue 115 15.52
No 626 84.48
BOARD Main 539 72.74
Second 202 27.26
FOREIGN Yes 427 57.62
No 314 42.38
TABLE 3 
Univariate Result
  Panel A   Panel B  
 INTERLOCK(n=647)
Non-INTERLOCK 
(n=94) t-test
EXECLOCK
(n=268)
Non-EXECLOCK 
(n=473) t-test
ROE
Mean
Std dev
 
0.050
0.391
 
0.006
0.304
-1.07 0.062
 0.279 
0.035
 0.428 
 -0.95
ROA
Mean 
Std dev
 
0.039
0.123
0.023
0.100 
-1.26
 
0.044
0.130
 
0.034
0.115
-1.10 
Continue:
  Panel C   Panel D  
 NONLOCK (n=287)
Non-NONLOCK 
(n=454) t-test
INDLOCK 
(n=580)
Non-INDLOCK 
(n=161) t-test
ROE
Mean
Std dev
 
0.039
0.517
 
0.048
0.261
0.32  0.0610.221
-0.014
0.700 -2.22**
ROA
Mean
Std dev
 
0.042
0.154
0.034
0.093 
-0.84 0.0400.097
0.026
0.182 -1.32
Continue:
  Panel E   Panel F  
 INTER (n=606)
Non-INTER
(n=135) t-test
INTRA 
(n=385)
Non-INTRA 
(n=356) t-test
ROE
Mean
Std dev
0.053
0.402 
0.006
0.263
-1.32
 
0.065
0.247
0.024
0.486 
 -1.46
ROA
Mean
Std dev
0.042
0.126
0.018
0.092 -2.10**
0.042
0.124
0.032
0.117 -1.10
** significant at 5 % level (2-tailed)
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directorates. In general, interlocking 
companies have a higher mean of ROE and 
ROA than non-interlocking companies, 
which suggests that interlocking companies 
have better earnings performance than 
non-interlocking companies. However, 
significant mean difference is only found 
between ROE by comparing companies 
with interlocking independent directors and 
companies without interlocking independent 
directors, which suggests that companies 
with interlocking independent directors have 
better earnings performance than companies 
without interlocking independent directors. 
A significant mean difference is also found 
between ROA by comparing companies with 
inter-industry interlocking and companies 
without inter-industry interlocking, which 
suggests that companies with inter-industry 
interlocking companies have better earnings 
performance than companies without inter-
industry interlocking companies.
Correlation
Table 4 shows the correlation matrix among 
the variables. The table shows that ROE 
and ROA are significantly correlated with 
most of the explanatory variables. ROE is 
significant and positively correlated with 
INTERLOCK, INTER, TOTALOCK, 
I N D L O C K ,  B O A R D ,  F O R E I G N , 
GROWTH, LSUBS, LAGE and significant 
and negatively related to LEVERAGE. 
ROA is significant and positively related 
to  INTERLOCK, INTER,  INTRA, 
TOTALOCK, EXECLOCK, INDLOCK, 
BOARD, FOREIGN, GROWTH, LSUBS 
and LAGE and significant and negatively 
related to LEVERAGE. As expected, the 
correlations between hypotheses variables 
are significant and highly positively related. 
This supports the inclusion of the hypotheses 
variables separately, one after the other, into 
the multivariate regression. In addition, 
the correlations among other explanatory 
(control) variables are less than 0.5. While 
0.8 is usually used as a threshold for possible 
multi-collinearity, it can be assumed that no 
serious collinearity exists.
OLS Regression
Table 5 shows the Ordinary Least Square 
(OLS) regression results of the ROE model 
and Table 6 shows the Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS) regression results of ROA 
model. Both tables show that all regression 
models are significant at 1 % significance 
level. The adjusted R-squared of ROE 
model is between 0.050 and 0.056, which 
is consistent with Phan et al. (2003). This 
suggests that the variation of return on equity 
that is explained by the models is about 5 
to 6 %. Meanwhile, an adjusted R-squared 
of between 0.105 to 0.110 of ROA model is 
slightly higher than a prior study by Amran 
and Che Ahmad (2010) who had recorded 
an R-squared of 0.07. This suggests that the 
variation in return on asset that is explained 
by the models is about 11 %. 
Both tables show that all the hypotheses 
variables are positively related to ROE 
and ROA. Table 5 shows that the variables 
INTERLOCK, INTER and INDLOCK are 
significant at a 5 % level and the variables 
INTRA and TOTALOCK are only marginally 
significant (at a 10 % level). However, the 
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TABLE 5 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression Result of Return on Equity (ROE)
Variables
Panel A
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel E
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel F
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel G
Coefficient
(p-value)
Constant 0.059(0.61)
0.055
(0.57)
0.051
(0.53)
0.047
(0.49)
0.095
(0.96)
0.089
(0.90)
0.065
(0.68)
ISSUE 0.067(1.72)**
0.069
(1.77)**
0.069
(1.78)**
0.068
(1.74)**
0.066
(1.69)**
0.066
(1.70)**
0.068
(1.76)**
BOARD 0.038(1.14)
0.043
(1.28)
0.043
(1.30)
0.035
(1.06)
0.037
(1.11)
0.038
(1.13)
0.042
(1.26)
FOREIGN 0.059(1.92)**
0.060
(1.95)**
0.060
(1.95)**
0.057
(1.84)**
0.058
(1.87)**
0.059
(1.90)**
0.058
(1.89)**
DIROWN -0.000(-0.24)
-0.000
(-0.39)
-0.000
(-0.37)
-0.000
(-0.21)
-0.000
(-0.14)
-0.000
(-0.16)
-0.000
(-0.32)
BODIND -0.166(-1.90)**
-0.143
(-1.64)***
-0.139
(-1.58)***
-0.148
(-1.72)**
-0.180
(-2.04)**
-0.171
(-1.94)**
-0.159
(-1.83)**
BODSIZE 0.003(0.44)
0.003
(0.36)
0.002
(0.33)
0.002
(0.26)
-0.001
(-0.18)
-0.000
(-0.06)
0.000
(0.05)
GROWTH 0.042(2.72)*
0.041
(2.65)*
0.041
(2.65)*
0.043
(2.75)*
0.043
(2.76)*
0.043
(2.73)*
0.042
(2.70)*
LSUBS 0.045(1.15)
0.052
(1.31)
0.055
(1.38)
0.056
(1.43)
0.045
(1.14)
0.046
(1.17)
0.052
(1.34)
LAGE 0.046(1.09)
0.054
(1.28)
0.057
(1.36)
0.046
(1.10)
0.045
(1.08)
0.046
(1.08)
0.056
(1.34)
LEVERAGE -0.326(-4.70)*
-0.328
(4.71)*
-0.329
(-4.72)*
-0.336
(-4.83)*
-0.332
(-4.78)*
-0.334
(-4.81)*
-0.324
(-4.66)*
TOTALOCK 0.034(1.62)***
EXECLOCK 0.006(0.37)
NONLOCK 0.000(0.00)
INDLOCK 0.028(2.11)**
INTERLOCK 0.007(1.97)**
INTER 0.007(1.69)**
INTRA 0.015(1.53)***
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.054 0.050 0.050 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.053
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*, **, *** significant level at 1, 5, 10 % respectively (one-tailed)
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TABLE 6 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression Result of Return on Asset (ROA)
Variables
Panel A
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel B
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel C
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel D
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel E
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel F
Coefficient
(p-value)
Panel G
Coefficient
(p-value)
Constant 0.027(0.92)
0.027
(0.92)
0.026
(0.87)
0.023
(0.78)
0.037
(1.22)
0.036
(1.20)
0.027
(0.92)
ISSUE 0.022(1.85)**
0.023
(1.91)**
0.023
(1.92)**
0.023
(1.90)**
0.022
(1.85)**
0.022
(1.85)**
0.023
(1.91)**
BOARD 0.031(3.02)*
0.032
(3.18)*
0.033
(3.23)*
0.031
(3.00)*
0.031
(3.04)*
0.031
(3.04)*
0.032
(3.19)*
FOREIGN 0.022(2.37)*
0.023
(2.42)*
0.023
(2.42)*
0.022
(2.31)**
0.022
(2.34)**
0.022
(2.36)*
0.022
(2.37)*
DIROWN -0.000(-0.73)
-0.000
(-0.95)
-0.000
(-0.89)
-0.000
(-0.76)
-0.000
(-0.68)
-0.000
(-0.67)
-0.000
(-0.87)
BODIND -0.029(-1.06)
-0.021
(-0.80)
-0.021
(-0.77)
-0.020
(-0.78)
-0.030
(-1.11)
-0.028
(-1.05)
-0.022
(-0.84)
BODSIZE 0.002(1.17)
0.002
(1.11)
0.002
(1.01)
0.002
(0.97)
0.001
(0.51)
0.001
(0.59)
0.002
(0.82)
GROWTH 0.017(3.57)*
0.017
(3.47)*
0.017
(3.48)*
0.017
(3.57)*
0.017
(3.58)*
0.017
(3.57)*
0.017
(3.52)*
LSUBS 0.014(1.14)
0.015
(1.26)
0.017
(1.36)
0.018
(1.48)
0.015
(1.21)
0.015
(1.21)
0.017
(1.41)
LAGE 0.004(0.29)
0.006
(0.46)
0.008
(0.59)
0.005
(0.39)
0.005
(0.36)
0.004
(0.33)
0.008
(0.61)
LEVERAGE -0.144(-6.74)*
-0.144
(-6.74)*
-0.144
(-6.73)*
-0.146
(-6.87)*
-0.146
(-6.83)*
-0.146
(-6.86)*
-0.144
(6.72)*
TOTALOCK 0.013(2.03)**
EXECLOCK 0.005(0.95)
NONLOCK 0.002(0.52)
INDLOCK 0.008(1.87)**
INTERLOCK 0.002(1.88)**
INTER 0.002(1.80)**
INTRA 0.003(1.08)
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.110 0.106 0.105 0.109 0.109 0.109 0.106
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
*, **, *** significant level at 1, 5, 10 % respectively (one-tailed)
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variables EXECLOCK and NONLOCK 
are insignificant. Meanwhile, Table 6 
shows that the variables INTERLOCK, 
INTER, TOTALOCK and INDLOCK are 
significant at a 5 % level but the variables 
INTRA, EXECLOCK and NONLOCK are 
insignificant. 
The significant positive relationship 
of INTERLOCK is consistent with the 
resource dependence theory as proposed 
by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), who argue 
that interlocking directorates occur for the 
inter-organisational coordination exchange 
of resources to overcome environmental 
uncertainty. The significant positive 
relationship of INTRA with ROE provides 
support for the postulation made by Phan 
et al. (2003) that intra-industry interlocking 
directorates are important for the coordination 
exchange of resources. Meanwhile, the 
significant positive relationships of INTER 
with ROE and ROA provide support that 
inter-industry interlocking directorates are 
important for a wide view of the business 
environment as suggested by Phan et 
al. (2003). Furthermore, the significant 
positive relationships of TOTALOCK and 
INDLOCK with ROE and ROA provide 
support for the argument by Fama and Jensen 
(1983) that holding multiple directorships 
increases directors’ ability as monitors due 
to experience and knowledge gained by 
serving on the boards of multiple companies 
and increases directors’ motivation to 
discharge their monitoring roles due to their 
concern about damage to their reputation. 
The insignificant relationships between 
the variables, EXECLOCK and NONLOCK, 
with two of the performance measures may 
be due to the possibility that these directors 
were appointed to sit on the boards of 
other companies due to their social group 
and thus, did not have any effect on the 
corporate performance as proposed by the 
class integration theory.
Related to the control variables, the 
variables BODIND and LEVERAGE are 
significant and negatively related to ROE, 
whilst ISSUE, GROWTH and FOREIGN 
are significant and positively related to 
ROE. Meanwhile, the variable LEVERAGE 
is significant and negatively related to ROA, 
whilst BOARD, ISSUE, GROWTH and 
FOREIGN are significant and positively 
related to ROA. This suggests that a higher 
proportion of non-executive directors on the 
board of directors and a higher proportion 
of total liability over total asset decrease 
corporate performance, while being listed on 
the Main Board, acquiring additional funds, 
seeing growth in sales and having a foreign 
subsidiary enhance corporate performance.
CONCLUSION
Earlier studies have shown mixed findings 
on the effect of interlocking directorates on 
corporate performance, which may possibly 
be due to the failure to recognise the 
nature and the direction of the interlocking 
directorates. 
Using data of 741 listed companies on 
Bursa Malaysia in 2007, it is found that the 
number of interlocking companies, inter-
industry interlocking directorates, multiple 
directorships and multiple directorships of 
independent directors have a positive effect 
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on corporate performance. The findings 
support the resource dependence theory that 
interlocking directorates are beneficial in 
overcoming environmental uncertainty and 
as well as the argument that inter-industry 
interlocking directorates are important for 
a wide view of the business environment. 
The findings are also consistent with the 
argument that holding multiple directorships 
enhances directors’ expertise and increases 
their motivation in discharging their roles. 
However, it is also found that multiple 
directorships by executive and non-executive 
non-independent directors do not have any 
effect on corporate performance, which is 
found consistent with the class integration 
theory. This is due to the possibility that 
these directors were appointed to sit on the 
boards of other companies based on their 
social group (consistent with the nature of 
their directorships) and therefore, do not 
have any effect on corporate performance. 
On the other hand, the argument of limitation 
of time and increased commitment due to 
holding multiple directorships as proposed 
in the corporate governance theory seems 
to be irrelevant, due to the restriction of 
directorships mandated in Malaysia.
Despite the negative perception of 
interlocking directorates by the public, the 
results suggest that interlocking directorates 
actually benefit shareholders by enhancing 
the performance of the corporation. The 
results also add to the growing body of 
literature on interlocking directorates and 
corporate performance. For future studies, 
it is recommended to consider using a wider 
data set or perhaps using a different data set. 
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